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We investigate a new strategy for incoherent eavesdropping in Ekert’s entanglement based quan-
tum key distribution protocol. We show that under certain assumptions of symmetry the effective-
ness of this strategy reduces to that of the original single qubit protocol of Bennett and Brassard.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) employs quantum
features such as the uncertainty principle and quantum
correlations to provide for unconditionally secure com-
munications [1]. In classical cryptography no mechanism
is known for unconditionally secure key distribution. The
importance of QKD protocols within cryptography is
paramount as they allow for the practical implementa-
tion of unconditionally secure cryptographic algorithms
such as the one time pad [2].
A quantum cryptographic system can be thought to
be constructed of two main parts; firstly the underlying
quantum key distribution protocol securely establishes a
common key between Alice and Bob, and secondly the
message is simply encrypted with the established key,
and transmitted. Theoretical models for quantum key
distribution protocols based on the uncertainty princi-
ple have been analysed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84)
[3] and models based on quantum correlations have been
proposed by Ekert (E91) [4].
Eavesdropping can be considered as the interception
of a transmission between Alice and Bob by an eaves-
dropper (Eve) and then the application of an appropri-
ate measurement to extract information. Regardless of
the difficulty of interception of the message, in principle
any classical channel can always be passively monitored,
without the legitimate users being aware that any eaves-
dropping has taken place. This is not so for quantum
channels. Any measurement disturbs the transmitted
state and hence can be detected by Alice and Bob. This
leads to a trade-off between the amount of information
that Eve can acquire about the transmission and the de-
gree to which she disturbs it and hence can be detected
[5].
In this paper we present an incoherent eavesdropping
strategy for E91. The E91 protocol can be presented in
four main stages:
• Entangled photons are distributed to Alice and Bob
who measure them randomly choosing between two
fixed measurement basis. This state is such that
in the absence of noise or eavesdropping Alice and
Bob’s measurement results are the same if they
choose the same basis;
• Alice and Bob communicate classically their choice
of basis for all pairs and discard all measurement
results where different basis were used;
• A subset of the remaining measurement results is
publicly compared and used to determine the error
rate (i.e. where Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes do not
coincide). This error rate is assumed to be due to
Eve;
• Finally, if the error rate is below a certain accept-
able threshold, then the remaining undisclosed out-
comes are employed as the key. Otherwise, the
outcomes are discarded and the whole process is
repeated.
In our eavesdropping strategy we assume that Eve pre-
pares both photons of the entangled pair before they are
transmitted to Alice and Bob. We do not analyse the
most general attack of this type, but instead focus on a
simpler symmetric attack.
We adopt a conservative view in which Eve prepares a
pair of photons in an arbitrary state, possibly entangled
with other quantum systems. These auxiliary quantum
systems are known as a probe. Without loss of gener-
ality [7], the initial joint state of the photon pair and
the probe can be assumed to be a pure state |ψ〉 of the
following form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
α,β∈{0,1}
| Eα,β〉|α〉+|β〉+, (1)
where {| 0〉+, | 1〉+} is a basis for the polarisation state of
a single photon. The states |α〉+ and |β〉+ refer to Alice
and Bob’s respective photon states. The kets for Eve’s
probe | Eα,β〉 are not necessarily normalised or orthogo-
nal. The only condition on these vectors is the overall
normalisation of |ψ〉, leading to:∑
α,β∈{0,1}
〈Eα,β | Eα,β〉 = 1. (2)
If we assume that Alice controls the EPR source, then
the security of the above E91 scheme is equivalent to the
security of BB84 protocol [6]. This is because Alice first
generates an entangled pair locally, keeps one photon and
sends the other to Bob. Therefore only one photon can
be intercepted and measured by Eve which is thus anal-
ogous to BB84.
Notice that if Eve is limited only to eavesdropping on
the quantum channel between the source and Bob, her
eavesdropping can be described without loss of general-
ity as an unitary interaction between Bob’s photon and
Eve’s probe:
1
|F 〉| 0〉+ 7→ |F00〉| 0〉+ + |F01〉| 1〉+, (3)
|F 〉| 1〉+ 7→ |F10〉| 0〉+ + |F11〉| 1〉+, (4)
where |F 〉 is the initial state of Eve’s probe, and the
|Fα,β〉 are again not necessarily normalised or orthogo-
nal, but obey the unitarity conditions:
〈F00 |F00〉+ 〈F01 |F01〉 = 1, (5)
〈F10 |F10〉+ 〈F11 |F11〉 = 1, (6)
〈F00 |F10〉+ 〈F01 |F11〉 = 0. (7)
The resulting global state of the pair and the probe is:
|ψ′〉 =
∑
α,β∈{0,1}
|Fα,β〉√
2
|α〉+|β〉+. (8)
However, because of the unitarity conditions
(Eqn. (5,6,7)), the global state obtained by Eve when
she is only accessing one of the photons is not as general
as the state she can obtain when she can access both as
in Eqn. (1). Therefore this proves that the eavesdropping
strategy in which Eve controls the source (i.e. both pho-
tons) is potentially stronger than the strategy in which
she is allowed to eavesdrop on only one photon.
We now turn our attention to a symmetric subclass
of incoherent attacks against E91 in which Eve controls
the source. We derive the probability that Eve guesses
Alice’s bit correctly as a function of the error probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob can estimate from comparing a
fraction of the key bits they obtain.
Let {| 0〉+, | 1〉+} be a basis for the polarisation state
of a single photon. We define its conjugate basis
{| 0〉×, | 1〉×} by | 0〉× = (| 0〉+ + | 1〉+)/
√
2 and | 1〉× =
(| 0〉+ − | 1〉+)/
√
2. For any b ∈ {+,×} we use the
shorthand notation |αβ〉b for the state of a pair of
photons in which Alice’s photon is in state |α〉b and
Bob’s photon in the state |β〉b. We define the Bell
basis {| 0〉, | 1〉, | 2〉, | 3〉} for the pair of photons Alice
and Bob receive by | 0〉 = (| 00〉+ + | 11〉+)/
√
2, | 1〉 =
(| 00〉+ − | 11〉+)/
√
2, | 2〉 = (| 01〉+ + | 10〉+)/
√
2 and
| 3〉 = (| 01〉+ − | 10〉+)/
√
2. In the most general incoher-
ent attack, Eve prepares two single photons and a probe
in any pure state |ψ〉 =∑3c=0 |Ec〉| c〉, where for simplic-
ity we use the Bell basis. The kets for the probe, |Ec〉
as previously mentioned are not necessarily normalised
or orthogonal, but nevertheless have to obey the overall
normalisation relation
∑3
c=0〈Ec |Ec〉 = 1. It is straight-
forward to check that
|ψ〉 = |E0〉+ |E1〉√
2
| 00〉+ + |E2〉+ |E3〉√
2
| 01〉+
+
|E2〉 − |E3〉√
2
| 10〉+ + |E0〉 − |E1〉√
2
| 11〉+ (9)
=
|E0〉+ |E2〉√
2
| 00〉× + |E1〉 − |E3〉√
2
| 01〉×
+
|E1〉+ |E3〉√
2
| 10〉× + |E0〉 − |E2〉√
2
| 11〉×. (10)
Eve sends each of the photons to Alice and Bob. After
public communication between Alice and Bob, Eve then
performs any measurement on her probe. We say that an
incoherent attack is furthermore symmetric if and only
if for any common choice of basis, the probability distri-
bution of Alice’s bit is uniform irrespective of whether or
not Alice and Bob share the same bit value.
Given that Eve is restricted to performing an incoher-
ent symmetric attack, the above condition requires that
Pr(α = 0, β = 0| basis b) = Pr(α = 1, β = 1| basis b)
and Pr(α = 0, β = 1| basis b) = Pr(α = 1, β =
0| basis b) for any choice of basis b. This implies that
ℜ〈E0 |E1〉 = ℜ〈E2 |E3〉 = ℜ〈E0 |E2〉 = ℜ〈E1 |E3〉 = 0.
The probability that Alice and Bob fail to share the
same bit value given that they have chosen the same ba-
sis b ∈ {+,×} reads:
ǫb = Tr
[
1⊗ (| 01〉b b〈01 |+ | 10〉b b〈10 |)|ψ〉〈ψ|
]
(11)
=
{
z + t if b = +,
y + t if b = × (12)
where the identity operator acts on the Hilbert space of
the probe and where we have used the shorthand no-
tation x = 〈E0 |E0〉, y = 〈E1 |E1〉, z = 〈E2 |E2〉 and
t = 〈E3 |E3〉.
We assume that, after public discussion between Alice
and Bob, Eve is aware of their chosen basis, and whether
or not their measurements yielded the same bit value.
From this data Eve’s objective is to guess Alice’s bit
value α. Assuming that Alice and Bob chose the ba-
sis b = + and that their measurement returned the same
bit value, we see from Eqn. (9) that Eve has to find out
whether her probe is in the state |E0〉+|E1〉√
x+y
, correspond-
ing to α = 0 or in the state |E0〉−|E1〉√
x+y
corresponding to
α = 1. Given a quantum system that is equally likely
to be in either the state | η〉 or |χ〉, it is known that
the optimal probability of guessing this state correctly is
Pc =
1
2
+ 1
2
√
1− |〈η |χ〉|2 [8]. In our case, Eve’s proba-
bility of guessing correctly is:
Pc|share,b=+ =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1−
(
x− y
x+ y
)2
. (13)
If Alice and Bob chose the basis b = +, but that their
measurements returned different bit values, Eve has to
find out whether her probe is in the state |E2〉+|E3〉√
y+z
or
|E2〉−|E3〉√
y+z
. Eve’s probability of guessing correctly is now:
Pc|not share,b=+ =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1−
(
z − t
z + t
)2
. (14)
Similar calculations in the conjugate basis give:
2
Pc|share,b=× =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1−
(
x− z
x+ z
)2
and, (15)
Pc|not share,b=× =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1−
(
y − t
y + t
)2
. (16)
Given that the choice of the basis b is uniformly dis-
tributed, the marginal probability that Eve guesses Al-
ice’s bit correctly is:
Pc =
1− ǫ+
2
Pc|share,b=+ +
ǫ+
2
Pc|not share,b=+
+
1− ǫ×
2
Pc|share,b=× +
ǫ×
2
Pc|not share,b=× (17)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(√
xy +
√
zt+
√
xz +
√
yt
)
(18)
=
1
2
+
1
2
(√
1− ǫ+ − x+
√
1− ǫ× − x
)
×
(√
x+
√
x+ ǫ+ + ǫ× − 1
)
, (19)
where we have used the normalisation condition x+ y +
z+ t = 1. Since y, z and t are non negative numbers, the
domain for x is [1− ǫ+ − ǫ×, 1−max(ǫ+, ǫ×)].
Now given the average error probability ǫ = ǫ++ǫ×
2
,
the above probability of a correct guess is maximal when
ǫ+ = ǫ× = ǫ. In other words, given the average error
probability, the eavesdropping strategy that maximises
the average probability of correct guess is the one for
which the error probability is independent of the choice
of basis. The resulting probability of correct guess:
Pc =
1
2
+
√
1− ǫ− x (√x+√2ǫ+ x− 1) (20)
reaches its maximum for x = 1− 2ǫ+ ǫ2 at which point:
Pc =
1
2
+
√
ǫ(1− ǫ). (21)
The above formula is identical to the formula obtained
by Cirac and Gisin [9] in their study of the security of
BB84 against a class of incoherent attacks with similar
conditions for symmetry (see Fig. 1). The fact that our
incoherent symmetric eavesdropping strategy has effec-
tively the same power as the BB84 incoherent symmetric
eavesdropping strategy is surprising. This is particularly
so given that the maximally entangled state |00〉++|11〉+
has the following interesting property:
A⊗ I(|00〉+ + |11〉+) = I ⊗ AT (|00〉+ + |11〉+), (22)
where A is any operator. This implies that any operation
on one qubit can be executed remotely by performing the
transpose of that operation on the other qubit, providing
that the state of the two qubits is maximally entangled.
In spite of this, there is no operator C such that
A⊗B(|00〉+ + |11〉+) = I ⊗ C(|00〉+ + |11〉+), (23)
which is why the two qubit attack is strictly more general
than the single qubit attack. This is of course because
the operation represented by B will in general result in a
non-maximally entangled state which no longer has the
property of remote execution of operations.
Note that the above result can also be expressed as
a trade-off between the error rate and the mutual infor-
mation obtained by Eve about the nature of the state
communicated by Alice to Bob. In this case we have
a situation equivalent to a binary symmetric channel so
that the mutual information is the capacity of that chan-
nel and is given by [2]
I = 1 + Pc logPc + (1− Pc) log(1− Pc). (24)
As before, the greater the mutual information gained by
Eve the greater the (detectable) error rate induced in the
communication.
In this paper we have analysed a symmetric incoherent
eavesdropping strategy in E91 quantum key distribution
protocol. We have assumed that Eve controls preparation
of the entangled photons. In spite of this, we have found
that there is no benefit for the purpose of eavesdropping
when compared to symmetric incoherent eavesdropping
in BB84. We hope that this stimulates further investiga-
tion into entanglement based quantum cryptography.
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FIG. 1. The figure shows the efficiency of the symmetric
two qubit attack. The probability of correct guess is plotted
against the error rate induced by eavesdropping.
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